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Cooperative behaviour is widespread in nature, but explaining how cooperation evolves con-
stitutes a major scientific challenge. Simulation models has shown that social network structure
plays a key role in rendering cooperation evolutionarily stable. However, not much is known about
the importance of initial conditions for the evolution of cooperation in networks. Knowledge
about this is essential for judging to which extent results from modelling and experiments can
tell us something about the real world. Here, we investigate how cooperation is affected by the
initial network positions of cooperators in different networks, by means of game-theory based
simulation models. We find that placing cooperators on high-degree nodes enhances cooperation in
standard scale-free networks but not in standard Poisson networks. In contrast, under increased
degree assortativity, Poisson networks can maintain high levels of cooperation, even exceeding
those of scale-free networks, when the initial placement of cooperators is perfectly correlated to
node degree. When the correlation is not perfect however, defectors placed within clusters of
cooperators can act as Trojan horses, allowing defection to invade. The results are relevant both
to computer simulations of cooperation in networks and in particular to real-world cooperation
experiments, where the number of replications is typically low and stochastic initial correlations
between cooperativeness and network position may be present.
Keywords: Evolution of cooperation, initial conditions, network positions, degree assortativity,
Prisoner’s Dilemma, Snowdrift game
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation, understood as behaviour where individ-
uals help others at a cost to themselves, has long con-
stituted a major conundrum for science. Cooperative
behaviour seemingly contradicts the central prediction
of Darwinian evolutionary theory that individuals will
behave in ways that maximise their own gain. Never-
theless, cooperation is found widely across species, in-
cluding humans, other mammals, fish, birds, insects, and
microscopic organisms [1–6]. Explaining the evolution of
cooperation has been called one of the biggest scientific
challenges of our time [7].
While cooperation among relatives can be understood
via kin selection theory [8], cooperation among non-
relatives is harder to explain. During recent decades, it
has become clear that social network structure (i.e. who
interacts with whom) plays an essential role for un-
derstanding the evolution of cooperation among unre-
lated individuals. Computer simulations have shown that
while cooperation does not persist in unstructured popu-
lations, certain network structures can promote and sta-
bilise it (e.g. [9–12]). Across animal species, social net-
works found in nature are indeed structured [13], and the
study of cooperation in networks thus provides a promis-
ing avenue towards understanding how cooperation may
evolve in nature.
A large body of work has investigated the effect of
different network parameters on the evolution of cooper-
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ation via computer simulation (see [14, 15] for reviews).
Some factors which have been found to have important
effects include degree heterogeneity [16], degree distri-
bution [10, 17], average degree [12], degree assortativity
[18], network clustering [11], and modularity [19]. How-
ever, while the role of network structure thus has been ex-
tensively investigated, the effect of initial conditions has
received relatively little attention [20–24]. Initial condi-
tions here include the initial frequency of cooperators in
the population, and the initial network positions of coop-
erators and defectors (i.e. the way in which the strategies
are initially distributed to the nodes).
Here, we investigate how initial correlations between
strategy and network position affect the evolution of co-
operation in networks. This can inform us about the
general importance of initial conditions for cooperation
in structured populations and is relevant in real-world
situations where the initial conditions can be observed
or are constructed. For example, in experiments with
humans playing cooperation games (e.g. [25–28]), initial
stochastic correlations between cooperativeness and net-
work position could potentially have a significant effect
and could influence the conclusions of the experiments, in
particular because the number of replications in such ex-
periments for practical reasons is typically low. Knowing
the effect of initial conditions are also important for judg-
ing the robustness of conclusions from simulation studies
and thereby their relevance for the real world.
A common framework for the study of cooperation is
provided by evolutionary game theory [29, 30]. Here, the
interaction between individuals is formalised in terms of
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2games where each player adopts one of a limited num-
ber of strategies which may be more cooperative or more
selfish. The game is played repeatedly and players adapt
their strategies to optimise their performance. Alterna-
tively, each iteration can be interpreted as a reproduc-
tive generation, so that the adaptation is genetic. With
this framework, it becomes possible to study the stabil-
ity and dynamics of cooperation in populations over time
(including evolutionary time).
Most of our current knowledge about the role of social
structure for the evolution of cooperation comes from
simulation of game-theoretical models in networks (see
[14, 15] for reviews). In such models, individuals are rep-
resented by the nodes of a network, and the links in the
network determine who interacts with whom. A key out-
come of the models is the frequency of individuals adopt-
ing a cooperative strategy (cooperators) in the popula-
tion over time. The simulations most often begin with 50
percent cooperators, which are randomly distributed to
the nodes. In other words, initially half the population
are cooperators, which are randomly positioned in the
network [14, 15].
We specifically study the effect of initial correlations
between strategy and node degree, by means of game-
theory based simulation models. We focus on degree be-
cause this is a fundamental measure of network position
that is easily interpretable (as the number of interaction
partners an individual has). We study this in Poisson
networks (also called random networks) and scale-free
networks, two network types commonly used in models
of cooperation and characterised by different degree dis-
tributions [14, 15]. In Poisson networks, most individuals
have degrees close to the mean degree, whereas in scale-
free networks, most individuals have low degrees and a
few individuals have very high degrees. For each type of
network, we use standard versions of the networks as well
as versions with increased degree assortativity (i.e. where
nodes with the same number of links are preferentially
connected to each other; also known as degree correla-
tions or degree assortment). Real-world social networks
are generally characterised by increased degree assorta-
tivity [31], and such assortativity is particularly likely to
affect the evolution of cooperation when strategy is cor-
related to degree, because it then affects the extent to
which cooperators are connected to each other. The net-
works with increased degree assortativity are therefore
likely to give us results that are more relevant for real so-
cial networks, whereas the standard networks provide us
with results that are more directly comparable to other
studies of cooperation in networks [14, 15].
We study the evolution of cooperation in these net-
works for two commonly used formalisations of coop-
erative interactions, the Prisoner’s Dilemma game and
the Snowdrift game. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game for-
malises a situation where behaving cooperatively in it-
self is not beneficial to the actor, and cooperation can-
not survive in a well-mixed population (without special
mechanisms). This game embodies the paradox of the
evolution of cooperation. The Snowdrift game models a
weaker social dilemma where behaving cooperatively in
itself provides a benefit to the actor, and a well-mixed
population in equilibrium can contain both cooperators
and defectors.
II. METHODS
In order to investigate the effect of initial correlations
between strategy and network position on the evolution
of cooperation, we built an agent-based simulation model
(implemented in MATLAB). In the following we summa-
rize the model framework, and we describe the networks,
the different types of initial strategy distributions used,
and our simulation procedures. To make the results com-
parable with other studies, the model framework follows
commonly used standards for simulations of cooperation
in networks. For further details and mathematical de-
scription of the model, we refer the reader to Section V
(Model details).
A. Simulation model summary
The model simulates the evolution of cooperation in
networks, where each node in the network corresponds
to an individual and the links between the nodes deter-
mine who interacts with who. Each individual is either
a cooperator or defector. While the network structure
does not change throughout a simulation, the individu-
als change their strategies over time, and the main out-
come of the simulation is the frequency of cooperators
in the population after a set number of timesteps. Each
timestep consists of an interaction phase, where all indi-
viduals connected by a direct link interact pairwise, and
an update phase, where all individuals update their strat-
egy adaptively.
In the interaction phase, each indiviual plays a sin-
gle round of a cooperation game with each of its net-
work neighbours (i.e. the individuals to whom it has
a direct link), and gains fitness payoffs from the games
that depend on its own strategy and that of the other
player. Each individual accumulates the payoffs from all
its games within that timestep. Individuals follow their
current strategy, i.e. cooperators only cooperate and de-
fectors only defect. The payoff values for each combi-
nation of strategies are determined by the game, which
is either the Prisoner’s Dilemma game or the Snowdrift
game (i.e. separate simulations are run for each of the
two games). For both games the payoffs are named as
follows: A defector gets the temptation to defect T when
playing against a cooperator and the punishment P when
playing against another defector. A cooperator gets the
reward R when playing against another cooperator and
the sucker’s payoff S when playing against a defector.
Both games formalise a situation where there is a temp-
tation to defect (modelled by setting T as the highest
3value, i.e. a defector playing against a cooperator gains
the highest payoff), but if both individuals defect they
are worse off than if they both cooperate (formal defini-
tions of the games can be found in section V). To make
our results comparable to those of seminal papers in the
field (e.g. [9, 10, 17, 32]), we use one-parameter versions
of the two games, where the severity of the cooperative
dilemma (i.e. how hard it is for cooperation to evolve, ev-
erything else equal) is determined by a single parameter.
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, this parameter is called b and
corresponds to the temptation to defect T ; in the Snow-
drift game the parameter is called ρ and corresponds to
the cost-to-benefit ratio of mutual cooperation (see Sec-
tion V for details).
When all network neighbours have interacted, each in-
dividual determines whether to change its strategy, based
on how well it did in the interaction phase in terms of its
accumulated game payoffs (which is called its fitness). To
make this decision, the individual follows the proportional
imititation update rule ([10, 32], formalized in Section V)
and compares its own fitness to that of a randomly picked
network neighbour. If the individual has higher fitness
than the neighbour, it keeps its current strategy. If it has
lower fitness than the neighbour, it copies the strategy of
the neighbour with a probability that is relative to the
difference between the neighbour’s fitness and its own.
B. Networks
We use four types of networks: standard versions of
Poisson and scale-free networks, and versions of these
networks with the same degree distributions but with
increased degree assortativity. All networks have N =
103 nodes and an average degree of d¯ = 10, and we use
only networks where all nodes are contained in a single
component, i.e. all nodes are at least indirectly connected
to each other.
The standard Poisson networks are of the Erdo¨s-Renyi
(ER) random network type [33] and the standard scale-
free networks are of the Baraba´si-Albert (BA) type [34].
To generate versions of these networks with increased
degree assortativity, we apply the algorithm introduced
by Xulvi-Brunet and Sokolov [35], which preserves the
degree distribution of the network. The algorithm con-
sists of iterated rewiring rounds. In each rewiring round,
two links of the network are chosen uniformly at random
and one of two rewiring schemes are carried out: (i) with
probability p the links are rewired such that one link con-
nects the two nodes of highest degree and one connects
the two nodes of lowest degree (if this is not already the
case); (ii) with probability 1− p the links are rewired at
random. The degree assortativity of the network can thus
be controlled by varying p. We use p = 1 (i.e. maximal
degree assortativity given the degree distribution and the
condition of all nodes belonging to the same component).
The rewiring procedure must be repeated sufficiently
many times that almost all links have been rewired,
i.e. such that every link has been selected for rewiring
with high probability. Denoting the total number of
links in the network by L, after k iterations the prob-
ability that a given link has not yet been selected is
(1 − 2/L)k ≈ e−2k/L for large L. The number of links
not yet selected is thus approximately Le−2k/L. Re-
quiring this number to be of order unity, we see that
we need k ≈ L log(L)/2 iterations. To make sure we
reach maximum assortativity for a given network, we take
k = 10L log(L).
C. Initial strategy distributions
A key outcome of the simulations is how the fraction of
cooperators evolves. Denoting the total number of nodes
by N and the number of cooperators by Nc, this frac-
tion is r = Nc/N . In the beginning of each simulation, a
subset of nodes are assigned the cooperator strategy and
the rest the defector strategy. The initial fraction of co-
operators is rin. Following common convention we take
rin = 1/2 (i.e. initially, half of the nodes are coopera-
tors). In order to investigate how the initial distribution
of strategies in the network affects the evolution of coop-
eration, we use three different strategy assignment rules:
(1) Uniform. Nrin cooperator nodes are picked uni-
formly at random among all nodes. The remaining
nodes are assigned the defector strategy. The prob-
ability for any given node to be a cooperator ini-
tially equals rin. This strategy assignment method
gives a baseline for our investigations, where there
is no correlation between strategy and degree.
(2) Stochastic by degree. Cooperator nodes are selected
sequentially based on their relative degree. The
first cooperator node is drawn among all nodes,
with the probability of drawing node i given by
di/
∑
j dj , where di is the degree of node i. Each
subsequent cooperator node is drawn from the re-
maining set of nodes according to di/
∑
j /∈C dj ,
where C is the set of nodes which have already
been selected. This is iterated until Nrin nodes
have been assigned the cooperator strategy. The
remaining nodes are assigned the defector strategy
[36]. This strategy assignment method creates cor-
relation between strategy and degree, with coop-
erators placed preferentially on high-degree nodes,
but with some stochasticity in the placement.
(3) Deterministic by degree. The Nrin nodes of highest
degree are assigned the cooperator strategy while
the rest are assigned the defector strategy. This
strategy assignment method results in perfect cor-
relation between strategy and degree, where all co-
operators have higher degree than the defectors.
4FIG. 1. Fraction of cooperator nodes over time from a sim-
ulation on a standard scale-free (BA) network for Prisoner’s
Dilemma with b = 2 and initial strategy distribution created
by the stochastic by degree assignment rule. The red shaded
region indicates the last 100 generations used to compute the
final fraction of cooperators. Insets: Snapshots of the co-
operator fraction vs. node degree at timesteps 1, 3000, and
10000, for degree 1-20 (above 20 there are only few nodes per
degree).
D. Simulation procedures
We run simulations for all combinations of the four net-
work types, the two games, and the three types of initial
strategy distributions described above. For each of these
combinations we run simulations for varying values of the
game parameter b or ρ (i.e. for different severities of the
cooperative dilemma). Following common convention we
use parameter values across the intervals 1 ≤ b ≤ 2 and
0 < ρ ≤ 1. We run 50 replications for each setting, and
all simulations have a total of tmax = 10
4 timesteps. The
final fraction of cooperators for a given setting is calcu-
lated as the average fraction in the last 100 timesteps of
the 50 replications.
An example of a simulation run (i.e. a single replica-
tion) is shown in Fig. 1. In this particular example, the
cooperator fraction r drops from the initial value of 0.5
to close to zero at the end of the simulation, i.e. coopera-
tion approaches extinction. The example is for Prisoner’s
Dilemma in a standard scale-free network, with stochas-
tic by degree initial strategy distribution. The insets in-
dicate that higher-degree nodes tend to be more likely to
be cooperators, as expected under this type of strategy
distribution.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We find that initially placing cooperators preferentially
on high-degree nodes generally promotes cooperation in
scale-free networks, whereas it has no effect in Poisson
networks in most of the settings considered, with an inter-
esting exception: as discussed below, placing cooperators
on high-degree nodes can strongly promote cooperation
in degree-assorted Poisson networks for the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, but this effect is sensitive to Trojan horses,
i.e. defectors placed within clusters of cooperators.
The simulation results are summarised in Fig. 2. For
the standard networks (Fig. 2, top row), the initial strat-
egy distribution has an effect on cooperation only in the
scale-free networks, for both of the games considered. For
standard scale-free (BA) networks, when the initial co-
operator distribution is changed from uniform to degree-
correlated (stochastically or deterministically), the aver-
age final cooperator fraction is increased for all b > 1 for
Prisoner’s Dilemma and for all ρ > 0.125 for the Snow-
drift game. For standard Poisson (ER) networks, chang-
ing the initial strategy distribution has negligible effect
for both games. Also, for both of the standard networks
and both games, the stochastic and deterministic degree-
correlated initial distributions have similar effects. The
presence of stochasticity in the degree-correlated place-
ment of cooperators is thus not important in the standard
networks. In these networks, the effect of the initial strat-
egy placement mainly depends on the degree distribution
(scale-free vs. Poisson), with similar effects for the two
games and the two degree-correlated strategy distribu-
tions.
The picture is somewhat different for the networks
with increased degree assortativity (Fig. 2, bottom row
of plots), which corresponds to more realistic social net-
works [31]. For degree-assorted scale-free networks, both
of the degree-correlated initial distributions enhance co-
operation for Prisoner’s Dilemma, with the deterministic
distribution having a larger effect. For the Snowdrift
game, however, the effects in this network type are small
and inconsistent. For degree-assorted Poisson networks,
degree-correlated initial strategy distribution does not
affect cooperation when there are errors (stochasticity)
in the placement. In contrast, the deterministic degree-
correlated initial distribution has a large, positive effect
for all b > 1 for Prisoner’s Dilemma and also enhances co-
operation for large ρ for the Snowdrift game. Hence, for
the networks with increased degree assortativity, the ef-
fect of initially placing cooperators on high-degree nodes
depends non-trivially on the combination of degree dis-
tribution, the game, and the presence of errors in the
placement.
The increase in cooperation when cooperators are
placed on high-degree nodes stems from the fact that
nodes of higher degree have higher maximal fitness. This
is because game payoffs for an individual in each timestep
are accumulated from games against all neighbours, as
described above (also c.f. Eq. (6) in Section V below).
Since each node copies strategies only from neighbours
with higher fitness, a cooperator can turn a defector
neighbour into a cooperator only if it has higher fitness
than the defector. Hence, intuitively, a higher maximal
fitness for cooperators is likely to facilitate the spread of
the cooperative strategy.
However, we see that placing cooperators on high-
degree nodes does not always enhance cooperation. To
better understand when such placement will have an ef-
fect, we may ask how the neighbourhoods of cooperators
5FIG. 2. Simulation results of the evolution of cooperation in different network types for the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (left)
and Snowdrift game (right), under different initial strategy distributions. The final fraction of cooperators (averaged over the
last 100 timesteps for 50 replications) is plotted against the severity of the game for standard scale-free and Poisson networks,
and for versions of these networks with increased degree assortativity. The three curves on each plot are for initial positions
of cooperators distributed uniformly at random in the network, stochastically biased towards nodes of higher degree, and
deterministically on the highest-degree nodes.
and defectors should differ in order for cooperators to at-
tain higher fitness than defectors. The answer is that a
cooperator generally needs to have considerably more co-
operator neighbours than a defector does, to get a higher
fitness than the defector. Specifically, consider a cooper-
ator node of degree d with n cooperator neighbours and a
defector node of degree d′ with n′ cooperator neighbours.
The fitness of two such nodes for games with payoffs such
as those used here (formalised in Eq. (5) in Section V)
will be respectively
F = nR+ (d− n)S, (1)
and
F ′ = n′T + (d′ − n′)P. (2)
The cooperator has higher fitness than the defector when
F > F ′. For the one-parameter Prisoner’s Dilemma
game, the payoffs are S = P = 0, R = 1, and T = b,
and thus F > F ′ if and only if
n > bn′. (3)
That is, a cooperator must have b times as many co-
operator neighbours as a defector to gain a higher fit-
ness. For the one-parameter Snowdrift game, we have
T = 12 (ρ
−1 + 1), R = 12ρ
−1, S = 12 (ρ
−1 − 1), and P = 0.
In this case F > F ′ when
nρ+ d(1− ρ) > n′(1 + ρ). (4)
We see that for the Snowdrift game, the cooperator also
benefits from a high number of cooperator neighbours,
but a sufficiently high degree can compensate for a low
number of cooperator neighbours. The inequality is al-
ways fulfilled for d = n′(1+ρ)/(1−ρ). However, for cost-
to-benefit ratios approaching 1 this diverges, and so in
this regime n must again be larger than n′. For the most
severe instances of both games, i.e. for the parameter set-
tings making it hardest for cooperation to evolve (b = 2
and ρ = 1), cooperators need to have more than twice
as many cooperator neighbours as defectors to achieve
higher fitness.
Placing cooperators on high-degree nodes increases the
chance that these requirements are satisfied and cooper-
ators can withstand invasion from defector neighbours
and spread their own strategy. Furthermore, the cooper-
ators’ higher number of links means that they are more
likely to be picked as role models in the strategy-update
phase (while this is not true for perfectly assorted net-
works, we checked that it holds true for all the network
types used here). Combined with their higher maximal
6FIG. 3. Example networks showing initial distribution of co-
operators and defectors using stochastic-by-degree (left) and
deterministic-by-degree (right) initial strategy assignments.
The networks are standard Poisson (Erdo¨s-Re´nyi) networks
of size N = 103 with increased degree assortativity. Node
size indicates degree and node color indicates strategy.
fitness this increases the cooperators’ control over their
neighbourhoods.
Given the above considerations, the more frequent ef-
fects of initial strategy distribution seen in the scale-free
than in the Poisson networks may be attributed primar-
ily to the difference in degree variation between these
networks. Scale-free networks are characterized by the
presence of nodes with a degree much higher than the
average (the so-called hubs). This means that the place-
ment of cooperators on high-degree nodes gives them a
greater advantage in scale-free networks than in Pois-
son networks. Our results show that the effect of higher
initial cooperator degrees on the difference in fitness be-
tween cooperators and their defector neighbours is too
small in standard Poisson networks to affect the final
outcome, whereas in standard scale-free networks the ad-
vantage cooperators obtain from being placed on hubs
results in higher final fractions of cooperators compared
to when strategies are initially randomly distributed.
The difference in effect of initial strategy placement
between the two types of degree distribution is less clear
when degree assortativity is increased, and the pattern
of effects is overall less straightforward for the degree-
assorted networks. This is likely to be primarily ex-
plained by what we will call the Trojan-horse effect. Un-
der increased degree assortativity, because nodes of sim-
ilar degree are preferentially connected to each other,
initial placement of cooperators on higher-degree nodes
will tend to create clusters of cooperators. Such cluster-
ing is in itself advantageous for cooperators, as they are
then exposed to fewer defectors and obtain benefits from
each other. However, direct connections between hubs
also means that a defector hub can more easily exploit
a cooperator hub [18]. This leads to degree assortativ-
ity generally having a net negative effect on cooperation.
In our simulations, in line with previous findings [18],
larger degree assortativity decreases cooperation in all
cases (see Fig. 2), with one notable exception, namely
for the Prisoners Dilemma under Poisson degree distribu-
tion and deterministic placement of cooperators on high-
degree nodes (Fig. 2). Here, cooperation does better in
the degree-assorted network than in the corresponding
standard network. Indeed, in the degree-assorted Pois-
son network, relatively high levels of cooperation are sup-
ported throughout the game parameter range. In con-
trast, stochastic placement of cooperators on high-degree
nodes has no observable effect here. This pattern is likely
to stem from the fact that when the placement is de-
terministic, cooperators and defectors are neighbouring
each other only in one of the clusters created by the in-
creased degree assortativity, i.e. there is a clear inva-
sion front, with the remaining cooperator clusters being
shielded from defectors. In contrast, when the place-
ment of the cooperators on high-degree nodes is not per-
fect, the higher-degree clusters of cooperators are likely to
contain Trojan horses in the form of defectors that have
by chance been placed on high-degree nodes. Hence, in
this case invasion by defectors can not only happen from
the invasion front but also from within the higher-degree
cooperator clusters. The difference between the deter-
ministic and stochastic initial placement of cooperators
on high-degree nodes is shown in Fig. 3. It can be seen
that for the stochastic placement, the level of stochastic-
ity created by the particular algorithm used here means
that the invasion front is dissolved and even the highest-
degree cooperator cluster contains Trojan horses in the
form of defectors. Increased degree assortment thus tends
to induce differences in the effect of stochastic and deter-
ministic placement of cooperators on high-degree nodes.
Our results show that the presence or absence of errors
in the initial strategy placement can have major effects
on the evolution of cooperation, in particular in degree-
assorted networks because this is where the Trojan-horse
effect can make a difference.
Interestingly, the cooperator fractions in the degree-
assorted Poisson network under the Prisoner’s dilemma
and deterministic initial distribution are higher than in
the corresponding scale-free network (Fig. 2, bottom
left). This is opposite to the pattern found for standard
Poisson and scale-free networks (Fig. 2 upper left, and
previous results, e.g. [17]), where cooperation does best
under scale-free degree distribution. This underlines that
the extent to which a network structure supports cooper-
ation depends on the combination of multiple structural
factors.
IV. CONCLUSION
Initial conditions can have important effects on the
evolution of cooperation in networks, but they have not
been investigated much. Our results show that the ef-
fect of initially placing cooperators on high-degree nodes
7depends on the combination of degree distribution, de-
gree assortativity, and presence of errors in the place-
ment of cooperators. The study underlines that strategy
distribution is an important factor for the evolution of
cooperation, and implies that the effect of initial correla-
tion between strategy and degree is important to consider
in real-world experiments of cooperation when the net-
work structure differs from standard (Erdo¨s-Re´nyi) Pois-
son networks.
V. MODEL DETAILS
The model simulates the dynamics of a cooperative
strategy in static network structures, with interactions
between individuals (nodes) occurring across the network
edges. Each individual adopts one of multiple strategies
defined by a game which models their interaction. The
time evolution is discrete, with each timestep consisting
of an interaction phase and a strategy update phase.
We focus on two-player, symmetric games with a bi-
nary choice of strategies, as is commonly done in models
of cooperation. The strategies are labelled ‘cooperate’
and ‘defect’, and the game is determined by the follow-
ing payoff matrix
cooperate defect[ ]
M =
cooperate R S
defect T P
(5)
Here, the row and column determine the strategies of
the two players respectively, and the entries define the
payoffs for the row player. The game is symmetric in
the sense that the payoffs for the other player are given
by an identical matrix. For each node i in the network,
we will denote the strategy adopted by the corresponding
individual by si. The payoff for individual i when playing
against individual j is then Msisj . Within a timestep,
each individual plays a single game round against each
neighbour, and we define an individual’s fitness in a given
timestep to be the sum of the payoffs received in all the
games against its neighbours in that timestep. That is,
for an individual defined by a node i, the fitness is
Fi =
∑
j∈Ni
Msisj , (6)
where Ni is the set of neighbouring nodes of i.
Two well-known instances of games of the above form
are the Prisoner’s Dilemma game and the Snowdrift
game. These are both characterized by having T as
the highest payoff, giving a temptation to defect. In
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the worst outcome is to be defected
upon while cooperating, with the order of the payoffs
being T > R > P > S, whereas in the Snowdrift game,
the worst is to be defected upon while defecting, with
the payoff order being T > R > S > P . Note that
in Prisoner’s Dilemma, the strategy with the highest
individual payoff is to defect regardless of the opponent’s
strategy. In unstructured populations (corresponding
to networks where all nodes are connected directly to
each other), evolution therefore selects for defection and
cooperation does not survive. In the Snowdrift game,
the best payoff depends on the opponent’s strategy, and
cooperation and defection can co-exist in unstructured
populations.
In our simulations, we use common one-parameter
versions of the two games (e.g. [9, 10, 17, 32]). For
Prisoner’s Dilemma, we set R = 1 and P = S = 0, and
the game is parametrised by the benefit to defectors
b = T . For b = 1 there is no dilemma while larger values
represent larger temptation to defect (making it harder
for cooperation to evolve). As is often done, we take
1 ≤ b ≤ 2. The Snowdrift game is parameterized by the
cost-to-benefit ratio of mutual cooperation 0 < ρ ≤ 1,
with T = 12 (ρ
−1 + 1), R = 12ρ
−1, S = 12 (ρ
−1 − 1),
and P = 0. In unstructured populations, 1 − ρ is
the equilibrium fraction of cooperators (for replicator
dynamics).
Strategy update is synchronous and follows the fre-
quently used proportional imitation update rule [10, 32].
For an individual defined by node i, a neighbour j is cho-
sen uniformly at random from the set of neighbours Ni.
If the neighbour has higher fitness than i, that is Fj > Fi,
then i adopts its strategy with probability
Fj − Fi
max{di, dj}D, (7)
where di denotes the degree of node i, andD is the largest
possible difference in payoffs for two players in a single
game round (i.e. D = T − S for Prisoner’s Dilemma and
D = T − P for Snowdrift). The denominator ensures
normalisation of the probability. We note that the above
update rule corresponds to replicator dynamics adjusted
to structured, finite populations [10, 32, 37]. Also note
that the update phase can alternatively be interpreted as
reproduction, in which case each timestep is a generation.
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